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Abstract
Albeit Artificial Intelligent (AI) based systems are nowa-
days deployed in a variety of safety critical domains,
current engineering methods and standards are barely
applicable for their development and assurance. The lack
of common criteria to assess safety levels as well as the
dependency of certain development phases w.r.t. the chosen
technology (e.g., machine learning modules) are among the
identified drawbacks. In addition, the development of such
engineering methods has been hampered by the emerging
challenges in AI-based systems design mainly regarding
autonomy, correctness and prevention of catastrophic risks.
In this paper we propose an approach to conduct a safe-
by-design development process for AI based systems. The
approach relies upon a method which benefits from a
reference AI architecture and safety principles. This contri-
bution helps to address safety concerns and to comprehend
current AI architectures diversity and particularities.
Index Terms—safe-by-design, AI, safety, engineering
I. Introduction
The implementation of Artificial Intelligence (AI) based
systems has progressed in many aspects. The technology
shows increasing levels in tasks automation and adaptation
to the context. For instance, for self-driving vehicles,
we can cite the DriveMe project on Volvo XC90 series
launched in 2013 [1], the Autopilot technology integrated
in Tesla vehicles since 2013 [2], and the Waymo project of
Google which conducted the world’s first self-driving ride
on public roads [3] claiming maximum autonomy level (5).
Several instances of systems based upon AI technology can
be found in the literature, e.g., [4], [5]. The main concerns
addressed by those architectures are related to (1) the limits
imposed by sensors’ detection, (2) the heuristic nature of
machine learning (ML) and deep learning (DL) techniques,
and (3) the variability and complexity of context scenarios.
Whereas current technology and implementations show
approach feasibility and provide some solutions to referred
concerns, they are mostly committed to improve system’s
autonomy letting aside other aspects of the engineering
process. In general for AI-based systems development, a
variety of engineering techniques are applied and com-
bined with almost empirical parameters, choices which
are finally tuned to optimize performance [6]. Despite the
engineering process has proven certain effectiveness, it also
shows some drawbacks regarding safety assessment. In
particular, the lack of a comprehensive process to settle
common criteria and thresholds for safety evaluation and
certification. To our knowledge, the problem is quite hard
to solve and no current approach overcomes related issues:
an AI-based system should integrate sensor devices with
limited - sometimes opaque - detection capabilities (≤90%
in average), deploy algorithms to identify and properly
react to complex, rather unforeseen, situational scenarios
and, on top of that, ensure negligible likelihood of oc-
currence for critical hazards and disfunctioning. Moreover,
whereas for typical development methods, like the V-cycle,
the phases and their sequencing are almost static, it is
observed that for AI-based systems, the nature of certain
engineering phases and their order may vary. Some of
the factors for that to occur are the dependency of the
engineering process on the AI technology choices, on the
knowledge bases - used for learning - and on their matu-
rity (representativeness of data sets, events, phenomena).
Although, it is consensual that safety analyses should be
conducted as early as possible and all along the life-cycle,
the few initiatives on that respect, like ISO/IEC 23053
[7], are still work in progress. Others, like ISO 21448
[8], provide insights on a safety-integrated process for
autonomous vehicles without settling generic criteria suit-
able for other application domains. Consequently, current
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standards landscape is barely applicable to the growing
space of AI-based systems, and new safety methods and
analysis processes are required to develop them. To tackle
the referred issues, the main contribution of this paper is
an overall generic iterative (OGI) method to conduct safe-
by-design development of AI-based systems relying upon
a generic architecture and safety principles.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section
II, the reference AI architecture is introduced. In Section
III, some safety relevant aspects to AI-based systems are
highlighted. The OGI process for AI-based systems de-
velopment is described in Section IV, including safety as-
sessment phases. In Section V, the safe-by-design method
is applied to the development of an autonomous system.
Some related works are explained in Section VI. Finally,
a discussion and work perspectives come in Section VII.
II. Generic Reference AI-based Architecture
The specification of a process development for AI-based
systems should consider the following particularities:
• Engineering process dependent on AI technology:
Subsystems or components implementing ML/DL
modules are based upon parameters which may re-
quire to be set during conception, design, implementa-
tion and validation phases. For those subsystems and
components, a learning phase should be introduced
whereas for other typical (non-ML-based) subsystems
and components, the learning phase is non-existing.
• Engineering process dependent on knowledge bases:
The learning phases strongly depend upon target
objectives and external knowledge bases (KBs). For
many complex AI-based systems, an iteration on
design parameters may be necessary after a valida-
tion campaign, e.g., to adjust detection ranges and
accuracy. Detailed requirements cannot be elicited
before knowing the effectiveness of knowledge bases,
ML/DL techniques, and parameters choices.
• Knowledge bases maturity: Due to previous aspects,
the AI-based systems development shall not only
depend upon ML/DL techniques and development
methods, but also on building up knowledge bases
(KBs) and making them evolve so as to improve cov-
erage and accuracy of objects, events, and phenomena
detection. Referred KBs shall be useful for detection
and for high level reasoning, e.g., reasoning based
upon intuition [9].
We propose to integrate the previous specificities from
early stages of design. Since a huge diversity of archi-
tectures and process cycles currently exist, the specifi-
cation of a development process should be as generic
and comprehensive as possible. We find suitable to first
introduce a generic AI-based architecture aiming to cover
most of them. The Figure 1 illustrates the coarse domains
composing our reference architecture which are briefly
described in the following items and in section IV.
Fig. 1. Generic reference AI architecture
• External knowledge sources: this domain comprises
KBs required for training ML/DL modules, for their
implementation and validation. At the beginning,
these external KBs are not part of the system, but
they are integrated as a logical component during the
engineering process, for instance, after generation of
training sets (e.g., via the feature vectors).
• Missions/goals: this domain of the architecture covers
the fulfillment of functional and non-functional goals
and missions of the system. Certain missions and
goals may not require the deployment of ML/DL
modules. Thus, they can be deployed by components
and subsystems relying upon typical technology.
• AI knowledge basis: this domain includes components
for the fulfillment of principles, directives and rules
which guide the AI-behavior. The modules pertaining
to this domain provide a basis upon which missions
and goals can be accomplished by the system.
• Smartness development: the smartness of the system
relies, at least, upon two layers of reasoning. The first
layer is in charge of detection of external objects,
phenomena, and scenarios. The second layer includes
monitoring of system status, self-positioning and re-
acting to external conditions according to missions
and AI-principles. The development of system smart-
ness depends on AI techniques like ML and DL.
• Overall models: the development of autonomy and
smartness demands an understanding of environmen-
tal and internal system elements. As for external
elements, a model of the environment is to be settled.
Among others, this model allows the interpretation
of external stimuli. As for internal elements, the
system should be able to have a comprehensive model
of itself. Among others, this model allows to asses
system self-status. Both models capture the current
capabilities of the overall system. To ensure certain
independence, the AI-system should be able to learn
from new stimuli and situations and it should be able
to integrate and deploy new capabilities.
• Self-control: this domain includes the functions de-
ployed to realize autonomy during missions and goals
accomplishment. A typical functional path comprises
sensors→controllers→actuators that respectively sup-
port detection, processing and decision-taking.
III. Safety Concerns for AI-based Systems
Safety is one of utmost relevant concerns when design-
ing AI-based systems. However, it is also a vast and com-
plex subject considering the multiple applications domains
where they can be deployed and their related specificities.
The main safety related activity affected by the specificities
of AI-based systems is the hazard analysis at the con-
cept phase of the system. Indeed, the implementation of
ML/DL components rise new concerns regarding emerging
categories of hazardous events. Referred hazardous events
exhibit an increased risk level (which may even be catas-
trophic) due to the machine overtaking over former human-
based activities. Along with more autonomy, the transfer
of duties to AI-based algorithms implies no further human
interaction as safety barrier in case of hazards. In addition,
certain typical safety criteria like redundancy do not suffice
anymore to ensure expected levels of availability and also
accuracy. The specific aspects addressed in this paper are
described in line. Some of these aspects have already been
highlighted in emerging safety standards like ISO 21448
[8] (see Figure 2).
Fig. 2. Hazard events related to ML modules
• Events indistinguishability. This issue is mainly due to
physical limits of sensors. In particular, because real
and virtual images are practically indistinguishable.
For instance, the detection of a stop signal can be
easily faked by a photo of the same. Light rays
and other natural electromagnetic signals used for
detection can be reproduced by different objects.
• Targets variability. Many objects, elements and phe-
nomena to be detected by AI-based systems exhibit
certain variability. Although AI-based systems should
cope with referred variability, questions arise if the
system may face unforeseen situations beyond its
limits. For instance, sudden deterioration or disfunc-
tioning of context signs may lead to wrong detection
of objects.
• Noises and error propagation. Along with variability
issues, the noises added by the background and en-
vironmental phenomena increase hazards impact, in
particular in case of dismissed/miscalculated noises
and errors propagated through the system. Environ-
mental conditions (e.g., solar winds, snow) may im-
pose additional constraints to system operation and
behave as background noises.
• Human-machine interactions harmonization. The op-
eration of AI-based systems in real environment is
quite novel. Whereas risks related to machine-to-
machine or machine-to-environment interactions can
be assessed during design phases, predict the out-
comes of human-to-machine interactions is far more
complex [10]. Although an harmonization phase can
be conducted, complex human reactions (e.g., psycho-
logical, societal, political) are difficult to assess.
IV. Safe-by-Design Method for AI Systems
In this section, we introduce a method to develop the
architectural domains specified in section II. The safety
aspects described in section III are integrated into the
cycle. The method is illustrated in Figure 3 and is described
in the following subsections. The method is iterative and
several phases can be conducted in parallel even if inter-
dependencies may appear.
A. AI-based systems development method
The main phases of the OGI process are briefly de-
scribed in the following items.
1) Missions and goals. This phase comprises the spec-
ification of missions and goals the system should ac-
complish. The specification mostly targets functional
requirements of a typical engineering phase. How-
ever, as for safety-critical systems, it also includes
the management of non-functional requirements.
2) AI principles structuring. This phase covers the
specification and structuring of AI principles upon
which the system relies. As for typical requirements
stages, the formalization and validation of consis-
tency between AI principles is a major stake. This
principles are processed afterwards in phase 4.
3) De-compositional analysis. This phase is dedicated
to decompose, refine and structure missions and
goals up to obtain a layer including detailed func-
tions. This phase mostly follows a typical process
of design refinement. However, notice that a subset
Fig. 3. Method for AI systems development
of functions and blocks are to be carried out by
ML/DL-based modules as described in phase 7.
4) AI knowledge basis structuring. The structured AI
principles in phase 2 are first decomposed into a set
of high level directives which are afterwards refined
up to obtain a set of rules including specific system
behaviors. The elicited rules play the role of policies
which help to guide - or even enforce - system
behavior when needed.
5) Allocation of ML/DL techniques. This phase is ded-
icated to allocate concrete ML/DL techniques and
modules to the functions and blocks elicited in
phase 3, “De-compositional analysis”, and to the
behaviors elicited in phase 4, “AI knowledge basis
structuring”. The allocation should (1) accomplish
the missions and goals of the system and (2) ensure
the compliance with rules refined from AI principles
and directives.
6) Knowledge bases selection. Once the allocation of
ML/DL techniques is finished, the KBs for train-
ing the respective modules are selected. Of course,
building up new or dedicated KBs may be necessary.
The KBs are the basis to generate outside-world and
system models as well as the evolution model by
performing the training tasks (see phase 8).
7) Detailed AI architecture design. The detailed design
of the AI-based system comprises at least three tasks
or sub-phases. The first one consists in proposing
the architecture to support the functions specified
in previous phases 4 and 5, including allocations.
In the second sub-phase, a distribution of functions
over the support architecture is conducted. This task
covers the exploration of the design space. In the
third and last sub-phase, the first layer of intelligence
is developed by training the ML/DL modules, i.e.,
the self-control functions for detection, processing
and decision taking.
8) Overall models development and integration. The
second layer of intelligence is developed in this
phase: the AI-system should be able to learn from
new stimuli and situations. The models of the
external world and the system itself have been
partially developed and integrated during previous
training tasks. Upon outside-world and system
models, an evolution model should be elaborated
and integrated relying upon (1) specific principles
governing AI autonomy, (2) techniques and metrics
to assess and filter new stimuli and situations (e.g.
adaptive decision making [11]) and (3) techniques
to integrate new filtered knowledge so as to grow
up system and environment models.
9) Settle validation benchmark. After the allocation of
ML/DL techniques, a benchmark for validation can
be settled. The benchmark includes a set of target
objectives used to assess performance and emit ver-
dicts. The target objectives are refined from missions,
goals, AI principles and other requirements e.g.,
safety requirements. The benchmark also includes
the data sets selected or generated to test the per-
formance of ML/DL modules. When applicable, the
validation benchmark can be based upon typical
validation and verification techniques like testing,
simulation, and formal verification.
10) AI system performance assessment. The system per-
formance is evaluated relying upon the validation
benchmark. An iterative process starts in order to
fulfill the target objectives non satisfied after the first
validation campaign.
11) AI system implementation. Along with typical tech-
nology components, the components including
trained ML/DL modules and their parameters are
deployed in this phase.
B. Integration of safety aspects into the OGI cycle
The assessment of the specific safety aspects of ML/DL
components, introduced in Section III, demands dedicated
principles. Referred safety aspects are integrated into the
OGI cycle (see Figure 3) as follows:
a) Situations analysis. This activity corresponds to a
typical operational situation analysis as in hazard
analysis [12]. However, special attention is given
to situations in which autonomous functions operate
and are at stake.
b) Malfunctions, faults and hazards related to
ML/DL modules. Along with classical malfunc-
tions, faults and hazards, the aspects referred in
subsection IV-A are considered as sources of new
potential malfunctioning and hazardous behaviors.
For their identification, each safety aspect is re-
lated to the architecture parts potentially impacted.
For instance, regarding events indistinguishability,
ML/DL functions, blocks and components carry-
ing out detection are to be considered; for object
variability and noises and error propagation, the
reasoning layer used for environment interpretation
is in cause, and for the human-machine interaction
harmonization, the decision-taking reasoning layer is
targeted. In addition, the heuristic nature of ML/DL
algorithms as well as their dependency to external
KBs demand the definition of a malfunctioning
matrix including false positives and false negatives
occurrence. The autonomy of an AI-based system
can be assessed based on its ability to cope with
multiple components malfunctioning and hazards
(accidental, misuse, natural). Concretely, for each
component Ci and target Tj with background Bj
the probability of error should be minimized:
P [ErrorC(i,j)] := P [FalsePos(i,j)]+P [FalseNeg(i,j)],
FalsePos(i,j) := ∪j{Ci(Accept,Bj)},
FalseNeg(i,j) := ∪j{Ci(Reject, Tj)}.
Other factors of components failure can be consid-
ered, in particular the failure rate λi along with
the probability of failure over time P [FailC(i,t)] =
λie
−λit. Thus, the overall probability of component
disfunctioning can be calculated by:
P [DisfC(i,j,t)] = ω1P [FailC(i,t)]+ω2P [ErrorC(i,j)],
ω1 + ω2 = 1.
c) Identification and characterization of hazardous
scenarios. Along with classification of typical haz-
ardous scenarios, the hazardous scenarios involving
ML/DL components should be characterized. Notice
that, the typical scenarios referred in ISO 26262 [13]
as “reasonably foreseeable misuse” are no longer
under human control and consequently should also
be reclassified. To do so:
• Scenarios involving ML/DL components are de-
fined as combinations of external stimuli, system
response (internal stimuli) and malfunctions.
• For each scenario Sk, subsets of KBs are se-
lected to evaluate the performance of involved
ML/DL components ({Ci}):
– Data/features characterizing legitimate targets
Tj (true positives)
– Data/features characterizing targets’ back-
grounds Bj (true negatives)
• The likelihood of each scenario P [Sk] is esti-
mated by combining the disfunctioning prob-
abilities {P [DisfC(i,j,t)]} of involved compo-
nents {Ci} according to the architecture struc-
ture and relying upon basic probability theory.
d) Safety goals elicitation. Elicitation of safety goals
based upon ASIL levels is rather coarse and thus
inadequate considering the current nature of haz-
ardous scenarios {Sk}. Since a huge diversity and
complexity of hazardous scenarios are possible, three
cases are identified from which detailed requirements
can be elicited:
• The hazardous scenario Sk can be associated
to a concrete behavior which is formalized and
monitored. A monitoring formula φ including
safety threshold θ can thus be elicited. For
instance, in the case of autonomous vehicles,
a formula for minimal safety distance between
them is settled: φ ≥ θ. In this case, the detailed
requirements are elicited in terms of a maximum
threshold violation: P [φ < θ] ≤ δ.
• The hazardous scenario Sk can be associated to
a concrete behavior but deriving a safety moni-
toring formula is not evident. If the behavior can
be formalized and a validation test-bench can
be settled, then performance tests are conducted.
In this case, the detailed requirements can also
be elicited in terms of maximum probability of
error given by {P [DisfC(i,j,t)]}.
• The hazardous scenario or the associated be-
havior are complex. Conducting performance
tests is unfeasible. In this case, the behavior
can be formalized and a validation test-bench
can be settled relying upon simulation. For so-
phisticated simulation test-benches, the require-
ments can be elicited as in previous case, i.e.,
via {P [DisfC(i,j,t)]}. Otherwise, safety require-
ments may depend upon simulation scenarios.
V. OGI Method Tool Support and Evaluation
The modeling and safety assessment framework of
the OGI method is implemented in Sophia, a model-
based toolset integrated with Eclipse Papyrus editor for
UML/SysML models [14]. Sophia uses Papyrus extension
mechanisms to support safety and reliability analyses like
HARA, FMEA, FTA. We evaluate the OGI method on an
ongoing industry-academy experimentation of autonomous
shuttles deployment on a sensitive site, as described in
[12]. Due to lack of space, the evaluation only focus
on selected method phases. A critical mission of the
autonomous shuttle is to adopt a safe reaction in presence
of an obstacle on its trajectory. The selected scenario Sk
corresponding to the mission is presented in the sequence
diagram in Figure 4. The scenario Sk involves the Percep-
Fig. 4. Shuttle safety critical scenario
tion (i.e. ContextDetection and SelfDetection), Navigation
and Motion control functions of the system. In the first
exchanges, the shuttle detects an object on its route, and
is able to brake at safe distance to avoid an accident.
In the second iteration, although the system detects an
obstacle on its path, it is not recognized as a person
due to malfunctioning. Consequently, the shuttle does not
take appropriate decision to avoid the collision. Figure
5 presents an excerpt of the architecture design showing
the allocation of the scenario functions. The SelfDetection
Fig. 5. Excerpt of shuttle architecture design
function (see Detected() in Figure 4) is realized by an
inertial measurement unit (IMU), a relative GPS (RGPS)
and a ML/DL component for data fusion (see Fusion() in
Figure 4), the latter computes the vehicle dynamics e.g.
speed, acceleration, momentum (see VehiculeDynamics()
in Figure 4), thus settling the model of the system itself.
The ContextDetection relies upon a set of LIDARS and
Cameras, and upon an ML/DL data fusion component
which structures a model including speed and position
of objects within the surrounding vehicle’s environment.
The Navigation function is also an ML/DL component
that interprets the scene and take a decision according
to safety and AI-based directives (see SafetyAssessment()
in Figure 4). The decision is afterwards sent to an ordi-
nary Motion control component for action-taking. Deci-
sion Trees, Support Vector Machines, Gaussian Mixture
Models, Fuzzy Logic, and other unsupervised machine
learning are example of techniques to be used for the
ML/DL components. In order to acquire their capability
of detection, scene interpretation and decision taking, the
ML/DL components have been trained with dedicated
KBs prior to architecture’s definition. The shuttle process
development follows the phase 1 to phase 7 shown in
Figure 3. Notice that, in the hazardous scenario in Figure
4 (failure in person’s detection), since the system was
neither able to perform a collision avoidance maneuver,
it presupposes that an intelligence layer is missing: the
evolution model to face unknown situations is still to be
constructed (see Figure 3, Phase 8). The evaluation of the
hazardous scenario is conducted based upon our proposed
safety assessment method. To do so, an existing hazard
analysis of the shuttle [12] is considered which covers the
phases a, b, c, d of the OGI cycle (see Figure 3). The
concerning fault in the scenario is the non recognition of
a person as a such. The overall probability of the hazardous
scenario P [Sk] (see section IV) can be calculated in terms
of the probability of disfunctioning for each component
P [DisfC(i,j,0)] as follows:
P [Sk] := λLIDARλCamera + P [DisfECUCD]
+ λIMUλRGPS + P [DisfECUSD]
+ P [DisfECUNavigation] + λMotionControl.
A detailed requirement for the scenario can now be spec-
ified as P [Sk] ≤ θ which allows to settle a target for the
validation benchmark and assess the performance of the
system (covering phase 9 and phase 10 in Figure 3).
VI. Related Work
Several works have been presented to identify and in-
tegrate safety during AI systems development by industry
and academy. In [15], a survey of main AI safety problem-
atics is provided, among them, wrong or cost-ineffective
objective functions, and ineffective learning phases. In
[16], a preliminary study is conducted discussing different
aspects of AI systems’ safety. The authors propose the
application of classical formal verification principles to
AI systems design, like randomized formal methods for
training, in combination with design space exploration
guided by safety criteria. The authors in [17] present a
design strategy for autonomous architectures which maps
safety requirements over a global control module. A lot
of proposals exist addressing the optimization of ML/DL
based modules performance, e.g., [18]. All previous cited
approaches either only cover specific phases of the engi-
neering cycle or are quite specific to a given application do-
main. On the contrary, the work in [11] presents a holistic
approach for autonomous systems development addressing
similar safety concerns as in this paper, and also relying
upon a layered architecture. Unfortunately, it does not
propose any criterion for evaluation of hazardous scenarios
nor for safety goals elicitation. The theoretical perspective
for a safe AI cycle presented in [19] is quite aligned to the
one in this paper, with regard to the integration of KBs into
the engineering loop targeting data and software diversity.
Being a theoretical work, the elicitation of precise system
requirements is nonetheless not covered.
VII. Discussions and Perspectives
This paper presents an overall iterative generic (OGI)
method for development of AI-based systems. The method
is based upon reference architecture domains dependent
upon KBs, environment model, validation benchmarks,
among others. In addition, the method integrates assess-
ment activities to tackle specific safety-critical aspects of
such systems. The assessment provides an enhancement of
the typical hazard analysis method to infer safety goals. In
particular, it yields the disfunctioning likelihood of an AI-
based component considering the typical failure rate added
up with the error probability of ML/DL modules. By ap-
plying the OGI method to the autonomous shuttle, a multi-
factor uncertainty was identified intervening at different
levels of AI systems design. A first uncertainty comes
from the accuracy and maturity of external KBs which
impact the learning process and performance of ML/DL
components. The use of fine-grained approaches, like data
diversification [19], is promising to overcome this issue. A
second uncertainty is the difficulty to apprehend the infinite
usage-scenarios space resulting from a “continuum” of
possible environmental-operational contexts, variants and
configurations. This often leads to poor system-context
specifications not representative enough to characterize the
scenarios space. A current trend for this shortcoming is to
settle enough specificities, from a safety point of view, to
define categories of emblematic scenarios [20] useful in
particular for benchmarking but without guarantee of cov-
erage exhaustiveness. The third uncertainty factor comes
from the performance limits of AI-based components, e.g.,
sensors blinding or other still unveiled environment events.
Interpretation and decision-taking layers are also at stake
when arbitration algorithms face contradictory directives
and must solve them in critical scenarios, e.g., between
safety requirements and AI-knowledge basis (principles,
directives, rules). As of today, there is no ethical solution
that has reached consensus on this sensitive issue. Finally,
since AI-based systems may still be unable to properly
react to changing environments (as in the case study in
section V), deploy new capabilities in real time is of
utmost importance to ensure true systems intelligence and
autonomy. In future work, we plan to conduct larger-scale
application of the OGI method on others safety-critical AI-
based systems to strengthen our conclusions and enforce
approach validity. We are also assessing the applicability
of other standard-preconceived methods, like FMEA and
FTA, in the context of AI-based systems. We would further
like to complete the OGI method to cover latter stages of
the development cycle, i.e., testing and validation.
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